When applying biometric algorithms to forensic verification, false acceptance and false rejection can mean a failure to iden tify a criminal, or worse, lead to the prosecution of individuals for crimes they did not commit. It is therefore critical that bio metric evaluations be performed as accurately as possible to determine their legitimacy as a forensic tool. This paper ar gues that, for forensic verification scenarios, traditional per formance measures are insufficiently accurate. This inaccu racy occurs because existing verification evaluations implic itly assume that an imposter claiming a false identity would claim a random identity rather than consciously selecting a target to impersonate. In addition to describing this new vul nerability, the paper describes a novel Targeted..FAR metric that combines the traditional False Acceptance Rate (FAR) measure with a term that indicates how performance degrades with the number of potential targets. The paper includes an evaluation of the effects of targeted impersonation on an ex isting academic face verification system. This evaluation re veals that even with a relatively small number of targets false acceptance rates can increase significantly, making the anal ysed biometric systems unreliable.
INTRODUCTION
In January 2010 Al-Mabhouh, a co-founder of the military wing of Hamas was assassinated in Dubai. According to Dubai's authorities there are up to 29 suspects, 12 of whom carried British passports, six Irish, four French, one German, four Australian, and two Palestinian. Interpol and the Dubai police believe the suspects stole the identities of real people [1] . This example highlights the risk that sophisticated attack ers can undermine existing identification systems by targeting individuals for impersonation. It is therefore important to ex amine the accuracy of biometric tools when subjected to such targeted attacks.
This paper is concerned with the general vulnerability of biometric verification to targeted impersonation. Verification occurs when a user claims an identity which is then validated by comparing a stored biometric signature against their pre sented biometric features. Whilst no verification process is infallible, significant progress has been made in improving ver ification accuracy and there are now many commercial bio metric systems in regular use. However, recent research [2] has shown how these systems may be vulnerable to deliberate attempts to subvert them.
Such attacks are conceptually simple: they involve find ing an existing person with a similar biometric signature and then fraudulently assuming that identity to spoof a verifica tion check. Traditionally, the security of biometric verifica tion has been measured using false acceptance rates. This provides an estimate of the likelihood that an imposter would successfully be accepted by a biometric system if they ran domly claimed a false identity. However, it does not accu rately measure the vulnerability of such systems to more de liberate attacks, which is the focus of this paper.
Increases in the use of social networking, online dating and centralized biometric databases have made identity sys tems more vulnerable to targeted attacks. These large search able collections of face and other biometric data increase the chance of finding a target that has a closely matching bio metric signature. Such attacks are particularly dangerous as they can be effective both against automated biometrics and manual methods of identification, such as visual passport in spection.
The paper starts by surveying the existing literature on the measurement of biometric vulnerabilities. It then exam ines the effect of targeted spoofing on a face verification sys tem. The investigation uses a publicly available biometric al gorithm and dataset. The paper then examines how the ef fectiveness of attacks increases with the number of potential targets. It concludes by proposing an additional metric for verification performance.
BIOMETRIC VULNERABILITIES
Technology evaluations of biometric systems primarily mea sure verification performance using the false rejection and false acceptance rates of the system under test with different trade-off priorities [3] .
Many contextual factors, such as facial pose and lighting, can have a significant effect on verification performance and, as the various biometrics have matured, these factors have been investigated [4] . More recently, deliberate attempts to attack biometric systems have been studied. Uludag et al. [5] have identified eight different types of attack based on the part of the biometric system being subverted. Attacks from Type 1 are aimed at the sensor and are the focus of this paper. The remaining types are attacks on the electronic systems and en rollment procedures used to set up and perform verification.
In terms of sensor level attacks, three existing methods have been identified [6] :
• Zero effort attacks, in which a person claims a random identity and attempts to be incorrectly accepted by the system. Zero effort attacks are the attack type being measured in existing large scale performance evalua tions that calculate false accept rates.
• Brute force attacks, which repeatedly attempt to access a system, adjusting a biometric feature until a suffi ciently close match is obtained [7] . Such attacks gener ally require unrestricted access to the biometric system (e.g. picking a biometric lock on a stolen laptop). Se cure access control scenarios, such as passport control at an airport, make such attacks less feasible as access failures can raise alarms.
• Artifact attacks, which use a synthetic biometric feature that has been produced from a genuine user. Such at tacks would also cover the attempted use of a surgically removed biometric features and methods which exploit residual features on a sensor [8] .
An additional consideration is that not all the users of a system will necessarily have the same level of security. This was highlighted by Doddington et al. [9] , who measured the relative recognizability of different users of a speaker recog nition system. Here users were classified into four different types: sheep who have normal performance, goats who are difficult to recognize, lambs who are easy to impersonate and wolves who can easily impersonate others. Attackers can ex ploit this variation to compromise a biometric system. For ex ample, a lamb insertion attack [6] would involve deliberately enrolling a person or synthetic feature that is known to have a similar signature to many subjects. The system containing the lamb subject would then be vulnerable to imposters claiming the lamb identity.
By deliberately selecting a legitimate user with similar biometric features, a targeted attack can turn any imposter into a wolf subject. Targeted attacks are a significant vulner ability as they have no artificial traits that can be recognized, either by an automated system or a human supervisor. They are also possible without control over the enrollment proce dure or the need for a confederate whose true identity would be made known, as is the case for twin impersonation or lamb injection attacks. Such attacks are also quite likely, as they are a plausible strategy for even relatively unsophisticated at tackers.
IMPACT EVALUATION
This section evaluates the effects of targeted attacks on the CSU Baseline Algorithm developed by Bohne et al. [10] for the Good, the Bad and the Ugly face recognition challenge [11] . The system has been trained using images from the NIST Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge dataset [12] . The verification system has partial robustness to lighting variation, expression changes and occlusions. However, its performance is much lower than has been demonstrated with state-of-the art commercial face verification algorithms [3] . The system was evaluated using the Color FERET face database, which has been available since 1996. The frontal face subset, con sisting of files labeled Fa and Fb, has been selected as it is more representative of relatively controlled face verification recordings and is consistent with the original FERET verifi cation testing protocol [13] . The dataset is made up of 1009 subjects of varying age, sex and race. The evaluation assumes the attacker has complete access to the gallery of subjects and the verification algorithms used by the system. In each case, half of the recordings of each subject are randomly selected and used as the gallery to which the attacker has access.
Each subject in the gallery takes the role of an attacker. In each case the gallery data is analyzed to select a target that the attacker will impersonate. In all of the targeted attacks, a target was chosen based on the best match score value of all of the possible combinations of attacker and target recordings within the gallery. The non-gallery recordings of the target are then compared against the attacker to determine imposter scores. Score values are also calculated for all the true match ing pairs of users of the system. These score values are used to produce DET curves showing the trade-off of false accept and false reject rates for different verification thresholds. A traditional zero-effort DET curve is also produced to show the relative effect of targeted attacks. The curve is calculated by comparing each of the excluded recordings against each of the gallery recordings to produce a range of scores for both legitimate and zero-effort attacks. It is expected that real de ployments may have more challenging input data and in turn may have more sophisticated verification systems; however, the experiments indicate that the relative effect of targeting is sufficient to warrant further investigation. Figure 1 shows the baseline zero effort attack DET curve and the False Acceptance Rates when targeting is applied at the baseline EER threshold value. The EER of the baseline is 17%. However, when a targeted attack is performed on the same system the false acceptance rate rises to 51 %, three times the original value and a significant security risk. If the threshold of the system is selected with the knowledge of tar geted attacks, the EER becomes 28%, which reduces the risk but increases the false reject rate to an impractical level.
1. Number of Targets
In the baseline experiments the number of targets available to the attacker is necessarily restricted by the size of the datasets. The size of these data sets is consistent with the number of subjects that might access a secure office environment but is much lower than many important identity scenarios such as passport control. To analyze the effect of increasing target numbers, further experiments were performed using the Face verification system. 800 gallery subsets of increasing size were created. These subsets were used in the selection of tar gets for evaluation. To minimize any potential bias caused by subset selection, for a given size, all non-overlapping subsets within the first 800 subjects were combined to produce av erage false accept rates across the different subsets. This en sures that a subset size of 1 is virtually identical to the baseline performance. All gallery members took the role of attackers using the subset to generate the imposter scores. Figure 2 indicates how the false accept rate increases as the size of the target subset increases. The graph shows the false acceptance rate for a threshold that achieves the equal er ror rate of the baseline system under zero effort attacks. This is a plausible threshold for systems that are unaware of the risks of targeted attacks. As the number of available targets increases, the number of possible subsets decreases, increas ing the error in the measured false accept rate. Much of the curve, however, conforms reasonably well to a least squares fit of an a.log(x) + b model, with a = 5.2 and b = 16.7.
One difficulty with using a logarthmic fit to predict FAR is that such a curve will produce values bellow 0% and above lOO%. Although FAR values are limited in this way, the dif ference between individual biometric signatures may not be. There are many different score distributions that could pro duce 0% or lOO% FAR values based on the relative difference between legitimate and imposter score values. As such the logarithmic fit can be seen as expressing the functional shift in the difference between legitimate and imposter score distri butions rather than the FAR value itself. As the FAR measure ments approach the bounds, excessively distant or close score values will have a diminished effect on the measured FAR. One way to understand this effect is to treat the logarithmic prediction as the centre of a probability distribution over FAR values that can pass outside of the bounds. This probability distribution reflects the likelihood of obtaining any particular FAR when the biometric system is evaluated. When determin ing the liklihood of lOO% or 0% FAR values the entire prob ability distribution outside of the bounds are combined. In practice this means that when the targeted FAR value reaches lOO%, the model predicts that there is a 50% chance of ob taining lOO% FAR for any given evaluation of the system. Further research is required to determine the shape of this dis tribution and to validate these predictions on systems which reach these bounds.
The fitted model can be used to provide estimates of the number of targets needed to achieve different false accept rates. For example, using this model, approximately 200,000 targets are required for an 80% FAR, 1,370,000 for 90% and 9,500,000 for lOO%. Larger evaluations are needed to con firm these predictions. However, they suggest that for national identity applications with many millions of subjects, such as passport control, there is a greater than 50% chance that this verification system could be subverted by any user.
An additional consideration is how feasible is it for attack ers to obtain information about the gallery subjects and the system being attacked. For small scale deployments, surveil lance may be sufficient to establish possible targets. However, some biometrics may be more vulnerable. For example, face, voice and gait are relatively easy to record at a distance while fingerprint, iris and finger vein may require more elab orate social engineering to obtain. For identity applications with a large number of users, such as passports, public infor mation may be sufficient. For example, a number of online dating websites have photographs of millions of users which can be anonymously searched using soft biometric constraints including, age, sex, race, hair color and height [14] . Central ized databases of biometric information are of greater con cern. For example, if the US Visit database was hacked, its recordings could be used to identify possible targets for face or fingerprint attacks.
CONCLUSION
This paper analyses the effect of targeted attacks, which can reduce the effectiveness of biometric identity verification. It illustrated the problem through the evaluation of a face base line verification algorithm, revealing that with 800 potential targets, attacks can increase false acceptance rates by a fac tor of three, reducing security to the point that it is no longer reliable for forensic identification. Further analysis suggests that the false acceptance rate can be estimated using a sim ple model that is proportional to the logarithm of the number of enrolled subjects. This model provides a means to esti mate the vulnerability of systems with many users and shows that for the face verification algorithm analyzed here, national identity schemes could be unreliable under these attacks.
